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OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD S. BENNETT, WALLACE
F. BENNETT, and H A R O L D H.
BENNETT, Trustees, dba THE BENNETT ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
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ARNEL K. DOWNARD,
Defendant and Respondent,
vs.
CLARIS E. JOHNSON and VELMA
JOHNSON and BOYD J. CLARK
and IRIS J. CLARK,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
13740

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
Appellants were co-defendants with Arnel K. Downard in an action brought by plaintiff, Bennett's Association for judgment against defendants, Downard, for materials furnished Downard as a general contractor and
against defendants, Johnson and Clark, as the owner
of the property the materials were used on under 14-2-1
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and 14-2-2, U. C. A. 1953, defendant, Downard crossclaimed for any judgment granted against him in favor
of Bennett's Association and for the balance due on his
contract with Taco Siesta International.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was submitted to the jury on two special
interrogatories as follows:
1) Do you find it proven by a preponderance
of the evidence that Bennett's made demand
upon defendant Johnson to exhibit the contraction bond in question before the action was filed
and that he did not reasonably comply?
Answer: Yes.
2) Do you find it proven by a preponderance
of the evidence that defendant, Johnson, was
a party to the contract marked, "Defendant's
Exhibit 1?"
Answer: Yes,
As a result of the foregoing answers to special interrogatories ,the court entered judgment against appellants as follows:
1. Plaintiffs have judgment against defendants
Claris E. Johnson, Velma Johnson, Boyd J. Clark and
Iris J. Clark, and that said defendants be jointly and
severally liable with defendant Downard on said judgment in the sum of $1,652.00 with interest in the sum
of $497.00, and court costs in the sum of $72.00, for a
total judgment in the sum of $2,221.00.
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2. That defendant Downard have judgment over
against defendants Claris E, Johnson, Velma Johnson,
Boyd J. Clark and Iris J. Clark in the sum of $2,221.00
representing the amount of the judgment that has been
rendered against defendant Downard, or any amount
defendant Downard is forced to pay as a result of the
judgment heretofore entered and further defendant
Downard is entitled to judgment against defendants
Claris E. Johnson, Velma Johnson, Boyd J. Clark, and
Iris J. Clark in the sum of $1,028.19 together with interest in the sum of $308.40, and court costs in the sum of
$17.50, for a total judgment in the sum of $1,354.09.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants Johnson and Clark seek a reversal of
the verdict and judgment against them.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The record on appeal consists of two volumes, one
of which consisits of the pleadings, minute entries and
similar papers. All references to this volume are designated by the letter "R." The other volume consisits of
the transcript of the testimony and proceedings held
May 1,1974. All references to this volume are designated
by the letter, "T."
Defendants, Johnson and Clark, were the owners of
real property located in South Ogden, Weber County,
Utah. They were contacted by a California corporation
known as Taco Siesta International about Taco Siesta
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constructing a restaurant facility on their property. As
a result, a contract was drawn up between Johnson and
Clark and Taco Siesta (Defendant's Exhibit 2) wherein
Johnson and Clark leased the real property to Taco
Siesta; that Taco Siesta would construct a facility on
the premises; that Johnsons and Clarks, as lessors, would
furnish Thirty-Two Thousand Dollars ($32,000.00) toward the construction costs. The contract further provided that the lessee (Taco Siesta) would engage in a
contract with a suitable contractor duly bonded for the
construction of the project. As part of the lease agreement that Johson and Clark had with Taco Siesta (Defendant's Exhibit 2), the funds borrowed by Johnson
and Clark were to be disbursed by a proper officer of the
bank and any unused funds to remain to credit of lessor
(Johnsons and Clarks). Taco Siesta was to also pay
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) as pre-payment of
rental; said sum to be applied towards monthly rental
at the rate of $50.00 per month; with rent at $650.00 per
month to commence five (5) days after: a) filing of
notice of completion; b) date premises opened to public
or c) not longer than 90 days after construction funds
available. The Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) check
of Taco Siesta was not paid when initially presented for
payment (Defendant's Exhibit 5) but was later honored
and Taco Sies<ta failed to make the rental payments as
agreed (T. 54, 55).
As a result of the contract between Johnsons and
Clarks and Taco Siesta, Taco Siesta entered into a construction contract with defendant, Arnel K. Downard
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(Defendant's Exhibit 1); the architect for Taco Siesta,
Joe Lewis Wilkins, signed the contract in the place designated as "Owner," with his signature in long hand and
underneath printed, "Taco Siesta for Clair Johnson."
Clair Johnson did not enter into the contract with Downard, nor did he authorize Joe Lewis Wilkins to append
"for Clair Johnson (T. 52) and defendant Downard never
claims that Johnson did (T. 71), but to the contrary,
Downard knew he had contracted with Taco Siesta, not
Johnson (T. 71, 72, 73). Downard did obtain a construction bond from United States Fidelity and Guarantee
Company in the contract amount of Thirty One Thousand, Eight Hundred and Sixty Dollars ($31,860.00)
(Plaintiffs Exhibit B).
Because of the apparent financial instability of Taco
Siesta, in presenting the check that bounced and failing
to pay the rent as agreed, Johnson instead of paying Taco
Siesta the construction funds, paid them directly to
Downard and the sub-contractors and materialmen by
joint checks until he had paid Thirty-Two Thousand
Dollar ($32,000.00) less the unpaid rentals due him
from Taco Siesta considering that the unpaid rental
should be an offset against the Thirty-Two Thousand
Dollars ($32,000.00) (T. 54, 55). This manner of payment was with the consent of Taco Siesta representative
(T. 41, 44). Plaintiff, Bennett Association, became apprehensive about not receiving payment from Downard.
Mr. Richard Winters, credit manager for Bennetts contacted Mr. Johnson and in the conversation learned that
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there was a contractor bond written by the United States
Fidelity and Guarantee Company through Eastman Hatch
Agency of Salt Lake City (T. 25). Mr. Winters was
given the name of the agent and the serial number of the
bond (T. 25) and as a result, contacted a Mr. Squires at
the Eastman Hatch Agency and was told that the bond
did exist; that it did not accrue to the protection of the
materialmen (T. 26, 85). Mr. Winters claims to have
made a request for a copy of the bond or to exhibit it
on request (T. 82). Mr. Winters admitted that he, upon
contacting the agent for the bonding company, was as
knowledgable about the content of the bond as if it had
been personally exhibited to him (T. 89, 90). The court
ruled that the bond (Plaintiff's Exhibit B) was sufficient
and adequately protected Bennett's Association (T. 91,
92).
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' and defendants' evidence, Johnson and Clark moved for dismissal of Bennett's complaint and Downard's cross-complaint (T. 96).
These motions were denied.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' JOHNSON'S AND CLARK'S
MOTION TO DISMISS BENNETT'S COMPLAINT.
Plaintiff, Bennett's Association, claim against John-
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son and Clark is based on 14-2-1, U. C. A., 1953, which
provides insofar as pertinent herein:
"The owner of any interest in land (emphasis
ours) entering into a contract involving $500.00
or more for the construction, addition to or alteration or repair of any building, or structure or
improvement upon land, shall before any such
work is commenced obtain from the contractor
a bond * * * conditioned for the prompt
payment for material furnished and labor performed under the contract * * *. The bond
provided for herein shall be exhibited to any
person interested upon request."
and 14-2-2, U. C. A., 1953, which provides insofar as
pediment hereto:
"Any person subject to the provision of this
chapter who shall fail to obtain such good and
sufficient bond or to exhibit the same as herein
required, shall be personally liable to all persons who have furnished material or performed
labor under the contract * * *.
The facts have shown that it was not the owner
(emphasis ours) who entered into the contract with
Bennetts but Downard who was contractor for Taco Siesta. And that there was no contract existing between
Johnson and Clark and Downard. It is granted that in
the absence of a bond or proper exhibition of the same,
Taco Siesta would be liable on their leasehold interest
for the price agreed upon (King's Brother's, Inc. vs. Utah
Dry Kiln Company, 440 Pacific 2nd 17), but the statute
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if it means what it says provides that the owner of the
interest (emphasis ours) in land cannot be held personally responsible unless said owner has entered into the
contract (emphasis ours) for the improvements. There
is no provision in law or equity for an owner to be per
sonally liable for obligations incurred by the lessee without the owner's authorization (King Brother's, Inc. vs.
Utah Dry Kiln Company, 440 Pacific 2nd 17). There
is a correlation between the statutes above cited and
the mechanic's lien law of our state. 38-1-3, U. C. A.,
1953, provides that the authorization for the material
furnished or labor performed upon which the lien is based
must be at "the instance of the owner of any other person acting by his authorization as agent, contractor or
otherwise," The owner in the instant case did not contract with the contractor for the construction of improvements upon his land nor did he authorize the contractor
to obtain materials and labor from Bennett's on his behalf. The question to be answered therefore, is whether
the lessee through his contract can make the owner
liable under 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, U. C. A., 1953. The answer based upon the reasoning of King Brother's, Inc.
vs. Utah Dry Kiln Company, previously cited seems to
be in the negative.
In the event that the court was to conclude that the
lessee, without authorization, can make the owner liable
for improvements constructed at the request of lessee
or his agent (contractor). We must then look to whether
a bond was provided, whether the bond was sufficient
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and whether it was exhibited to any person interested
upon request.
A bond was provided (Plaintiff's Exhibit B). It
was sufficient to protect Bennett's Association (T. 91,
92), Deluxe Glass Company vs. Martin, 208 Pacific 2nd
1127 (Utah). The testimony shows that there was a
casual conversation between Bennett's man Winters and
Johnson around October 29, 1969, wherein Winters seems
to recall the request but at any event, both parties recall
that Bennett's were given the name of the bonding company, the name of the agent in Salt Lake City and pursuant thereto Bennett's man Winters contacted the agent
and learned of the existence of the bond and according
to his own admission, knew as much of the contents of
the bond as if it had been personally exhibited to him
(T. 89, 90). What more would have Bennett's learned
if they had had the bond in their hands. We submit that
if there was a substantial exhibition of the bond to Bennett's sufficient for them to protect their interest, the
statute was complied with. After the suit was filed by
Bennett's, a copy of the bond was furnished to them (R.
4, 7).
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANTS' JOHNSON'S AND
CLARK'S MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT DOWNARD'S C R O S S - C L A I M
AGAINST JOHNSON AND CLARK.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The evidence is incontroverted that Johnson and
Clark contracted only with Taco Siesta. In their lease
(Defendant's Exhibit 2) there was a specific provision
that the lessee (Taco Siesta) would contract with the
contractor. None of the defendants, Johnson or Clark,
signed the agreement between Taco Siesta and Downard
(Defendant's Exhibit 1), nor was there any evidence
that the architect, Joe Lewis Wilkins, was acting as the
agent for these defendants. Johnson became involved
with Downard only because of the apparent financial instability of Taco Siesta and Johnson paid the money
to Downard and the subcontractors so that they would
get their money and Johnson would not be stuck with
liens. Johnson paid Downard only with the consent of
Taco Siesta's architect and upon the submission of an
account (T. 44, 46) (Defendant's Exhibit 6).
It is unbelievable that anyone could consider that
because Johnson paid Downard the moneys instead of
Taco Siesta that this created a contract with Johnson, and Downard is not entitled from Johnson and Clark
the balance of the money due him from Taco Siesta.
Downard was also awarded a judgment against Johnson and Clark for the sum of Twenty-Two Hundred Dollars and Twenty-One Cents ($2,200.21) representing the
amount of the judgment that has been rendered against
defendant Downard or any amount defendant Downard
is forced to pay as result of the judgment heretofore entered against Downard by Bennett's.
There is simply no legal theory whereby the conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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trator who failed to pay materialmen is entitled to a
judgment against a party with whom he has no privity,
with whom he has not contracted and who has not agreed
in law or equity, expressly or by implication, to reimburse
him.
Because there was no express contract between
Downard and Johnsons and Clarks, if a contract existed,
it would have to be based upon implication. This is not
the case here because of the knowledge of Downard that
he contracted only with Taco Siesta.
"An implied contract between two parties is only
raised when the facts are such that an intent
may fairly be inferred on their part to make
such a contract." American Jurisprudence, Vol.
12, page 500, Sec. 5.
In McCaffrey vs. Cronin, 295 Pacific 2nd 587 (Cal.):
"It is said that an implied contract is one not
expressed by the parties, but gathered from the
facts showing a mutual intent to contract." (Emphasis ours.)
From Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 17, Section
4, page 557, it is stated:
"A contract "implied in fact" * * * or an
implied contract in the proper sense arises where
the intention of the parties is not expressed but
an agreement in fact creating an obligation is
implied or presumed from their acts or as it has
been otherwise stated where there are circum-
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stances which according to the ordinary course
of dealing and the common understanding of
men show a mutual intent to contract. It has
been said that a contract implied in fact must
contain all of the elements of an expressed contract. So such a contract is dependent on mutual agreement or consent and on the intention
of the parties and a meeting of the minds is
required."
See also Restatement of Contracts Section 5:
Gleason vs. Salt Lake City, 74 Pacific 2nd 1225;
Kimball Elevator Company vs. Elevator Supplies Co., 272 P. 2 563, 2 Ut. 2d 289.
There can be no other conclusion derived from the
facts than 1) Johnson intended to contract only with
Taco Siesta; 2) Downard intended to contract only with
Taco Siesta. Therefore, there is no contract express or
implied between the parties and no basis for the verdict
of the jury and the judgment of the court. (Baugh vs.
Barley, 184 Pac. 2 335, 112 Ut. 1.)
POINT III.
COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 2.
The Court erred in giving instruction number 2 and
particularly interrogatory number 2 in the instructions
and the explanation thereunder for the reason that there
is no evidence whatsoever that the defendant, Johnson,
was a party to the contract marked Defendant's Ex-
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hibt 1. Defendant, Downard, admits that he contracted
with Taco Siesta. No where on the contract does the
signature ol defendant, Johnson appear and the record
is completely devoid of any evidence that the statement
"for Clair Johnson" was printed on the contract by any
authority or consent of defendant, Johnson. The evidence is all to the fact that defendant, Downard, knew
that he had contracted with Taco Siesta.
The Court further erred in giving the explanation
to interrogatory number 2 in that there is no evidence
that the defendants, Johnson and Clarks, knew that the
contract had been executed and that Joe Lewis Wilkins,
the architect for Taco Siesta, had noted that he signed
as owner for Claire Johnson and that Johnsons and
Clarks knew that an innocent person was relying thereon.
In this respect, Downard was certainly not an innocent
person because he knew that the only contract that he
had executed was with Taco Siesta. Further, how can
it be seriously claimed that Johnson and Clarks "deliberately lay back and secretly let others complete the
project believing that he was a party to the contract."
Johnson and Clarks as has been stated, at all times took
the position that the contract was between Downard and
Taco Siesta; that Johnson paid Downard with the consent of the architect of Taco Siesta and only to protect
Downard and his sub-contractor and to make certain
that when the facility was completed that there were
no liens upon the premises.
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POINT IV.
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN THE VERDICT OF THE JURY.
This matter was submitted to the jury upon two
special interrogatories found in instruction number 2.
Interrogatory number 1 is as follows:
"Do you find it proven by a preponderance of
the evidence that Bennett's made demand upon
defendant, Johnson, to exhibit the construction
bond in question before the action was filed and
that he did not reasonably comply."
Interrogatory number 2:
"Do you find it proven by a preponderance of
the evidence that defendant, Johnson, was a
party to the contract marked Defendant's Exhibit Number 1."
In the court's explanation following interrogatory
number 1, it stated, "If Bennett's made a demand to see
the bond and they were reasonably provided with a satisfactory method to secure the necessary information so
that such information was reasonably made available to
them, then there would be no material breach by Johnson."
As stated before, on or before October 29, 1969, Bennett's man, Winter, was informed of the existence of the
bond, the name of the bonding company and that the
bonding company's agent was Eastman Hatch Company
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in Salt Lake City, Utah and that thereafter, he contacted
the bonding agent and was informed of the existence of
the bond, but was mislead by the bonding company's
agent in believing that the bond did not cover Bennett's
claim which was untrue, as was found by the court. At
this point, Bennett's had all of the information they
would have had had they examined the bond personally
and had the knowledge in time to have filed a claim under
the bond before the statute of limitations ran out against
it and therefore, there was no material breach by Johnson and the jury failed to follow the court's instruction
and had it done so, would have found in favor of Johnson on this issue.
In regard to interrogatory number 2, the evidence
is insufficient to sustain the jury's answer to interrogatory number 2 for reasons stated before and so as not to
be repetitious, they are briefly, that Johnsons and Clarks
never entered into a contract with Downard, did not
authorize anyone else to enter into a contract for them
with Downard, did not at any time intend to enter into
a contract with Downard and the evidence is that Downard knew that he was contracting with Taco Siesta and
not with Johnson.
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN INFORMING THE
JURY THAT IF MR. JOHNSON SUSTAINED ANY LOSS THAT THE BONDING
COMPANY WOULD PAY FOR SUCH LOSS.
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If any explanation ran be made for the jury, answering the interrogatories numbers 1 and 2, as they did, it
may be very well found in the comments of the court
as found on page 91 and 92 of the transcript, wherein
the court informs the jury as to its determination that
the bond is sufficient, makes an explanation of bonds
in general and states as follows, "The bonding company
insofar as the court is aware, is still valid, solvent and
will stand any loss Mr. Johnson takes in this matter.
That is true, if Mr. Johnson suffers a loss merely because he is a landowner/'
This statement was objected to by counsel, but to
no avail, and the court did not attempt to rectify the
situation.
To a jury that perhaps could not remember the
assertions or denials of the parties; to fail to understand,
"Preponderance of evidence" or to remember all of the
evidence, this gave them the easy out because then no
one would be hurt because Downard could be given a
judgment against Johnson, Johnson could make a claim
against the bonding company which would not occasion
him a loss and the bonding company was not in court.
CONCLUSION
There was insufficient evidence to warrant a submission of the case to the jury. Defendant Johnson's and
Clark's motion should have been granted. There was
insufficient evidence upon which the jury could answer
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the interrogaftories as they did and therefore, the judgment against Johnsons and Clarks in favor of Bennett's
and Downard should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE B. HANDY
Attorney for Defendants,
Johnson and Clark
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